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plication, it results in a very strict and narrow rule allowing searches
and seizures after arrest for traffic violations only in exceptional cases.
RUDOLPH BUMGARDNER,

III

DISCOVERY OF PREJUDICIAL PRE-TRIAL PUBLICITY
ON VOIR DIRE
A major problem facing courts today is attainment of a fair trial
with an impartial jury when pre-trial publicity has been sufficient
so as to constitute "trial by newspaper."1 This problem has become
2
more widespread since the development of rapid communication.
It is most acute when there is circulation of prejudicial pre-trial publicity in the area from which the jurors are to be drawn. The courts
must determine whether pre-trial publicity has caused widespread
prejudice within the jury panel.
In the recent case of State v. Van Duyne,3 the Supreme Court of
New Jersey rejected an allegation of prejudicial publicity and affirmed
a first degree murder conviction. The "prejudicial" story first appeared in the community newspaper on the evening selection of the
jury began. The following morning, a similar story was published, and
numerous copies were found in the jurors' assembly room. Since one
juror had already been sworn before this alleged prejudicial publicity could be brought to the attention of the court, defense counsel
moved for a mistrial. Before denying this motion, the trial judge had
permitted the voir dire examination of the juror to be re-opened in
order to determine whether the juror already sworn had read the allegedly prejudicial stories and was prejudiced. 4 The trial judge also
permitted the voir dire interrogation to be expanded to determine if
'Sheppard v. Maxwell, 231 F. Supp. 37 (S.D. Ohio 1964). On granting a writ
of habeas corpus in the famous Dr. Sam Sheppard murder case, the court said that
the publicity both before and during the trial had been an example of trial by
newspaper.
-The problem, however, existed before rapid communications developed. Pretrial newspaper coverage of a former trial confronted the Supreme Court of the
United States in 1878. A juror had read local newspaper reports, but was found
not to be in fact biased. United States v. Reynolds, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
343 N.J. 369, 204 A.2d 841 (1964).
'During the three week period of jury selection, four additional mistrial motions
were overruled. The trial judge thought that at every stage of the jury selection
proceeding the defendant could be accorded a fair trial with that panel, at that
time, and location.
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there was any prejudice within the panel of prospective jurors.5 Each
juror was ordered to be sequestered when accepted.
The New Jersey Supreme Court completely reviewed the liberal
voir dire examination of prospective jurors permitted by the trial
judge. Relying on the principle that a ruling on a motion for a mistrial is within the discretion of the trial judge6 and is reversible on
appeal only if there is an abuse of discretion,7 the court held that
the pre-trial publicity was not sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a
new trial.
In order to determine the prejudice among the jurors resulting
from pre-trial publicity, the judge will usually resort to the voir dire
examination. This oral interrogation seems to be the only practical
way of ascertaining the predetermined prejudices of the jurors. This
prejudice must be discovered before the remedial motions-change of
venue and continuance-can be effectively ruled upon.8 The answers
of the individual jurors to the propounded questions will show any
existing prejudice and, at the same time, indicate the attitude of the
entire panel9 The record of the trial will include this interrogation so
that the appellate court can also make an independent evaluation of
the impartiality of the jurors.0
The voir dire examination in Juelich v. United States" revealed
prejudice among the entire panel of prospective jurors. In that case,
of the eighty-one jurors on the panel, ten were excused; fifty-one
'-The purpose of this oral interrogation of prospective juriors by either judge or
counsel, or both, is to determine the conscious, and even subconscious, biases a
juror may have. Although this procedure may be clumsy, imperfect, and time consuming, it is the only practical way to disclose any existing prejudices. United
States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950).
'Vhen ruling on a remedial motion, this discretion of the trial judge is
similar to the defendant's burden of proving that the jurors were in fact biased.
Because of the judge's first-hand observation, his ruling has great weight on appeal. Gicinto v. United States, 212 F.2d 8 (8th Cir. 1954); see United States v. Parr,
17 F.R.D. 512 (S.D. Tex. 1955.)
'Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15 ('919); Holt v. United States, 218 U.S.
245 (1910).
6
The advantages and reasons for holding the motions in abeyance until after
the voir dire is completed, revealing any possible prejudice, can be seen in United
States v. Suchman, 206 F. Supp. 688 (D. Md. 1962); United States v. Dioguardi, 147
F. Supp. 421 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); and Ohio v. Sheppard, 165 Ohio St. 293, 135 N.E.2d
340 (1956).
'See Rakes v. United States, 169 F.2d 739 (4th Gir. 1948). Remedial motions
were denied here because of the satisfaction of the trial judge, based on the voir
dire examination, that the jury in Richmond, Virginia, was impartial. The offense
was committed in Fredericksburg, Virginia, 5o miles away. The same jury also acquitted appellant's co-defendant on all counts.
"°United States v. Bando, 244 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1957).
n214 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1954).
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thought both defendants were engaged in the killing; twelve thought
either or both of the defendants were guilty; two thought defendant
Juelich was the guilty party; and six had no opinion. In reversing a
conviction, the court said: "We have not yet found any decision, and
we have been cited to none, wherein a defendant has been held to have
had a fair trial after conviction by a jury of twelve men, every member
of which had sworn on voir dire that he had no opinion the defendant
was guilty."' 2 Similar prejudice was shown by the voir dire examination of prospective jurors in Irvin v. Dowd,13 where 90 per cent of the
panel of 430 had some opinion of guilt, ranging from mere suspicion
to absolute certainty. Two-thirds of the jurors selected had an opinion
that the accused was guilty and were familiar with all the material
facts and circumstances involved.
Publicity alleged to be prejudicial may be directed toward groups
rather than individuals. When considering this type of publicity, the
courts often require a direct attack on the accused in addition to the
attack on the group itself. Attacks on organizations, such as the Communist Party, have been held insufficient where reference was not personally directed toward the defendants. 14 This additional requirement
was applied, with the same result, to publicity directed against a savings and loan association where the defendant was himself an officer,
but not personally attacked.15
A guideline to aid the trial judge in exercising his discretion in
determining from the voir dire the effect of the alleged prejudicial pretrial publicity16 was established by the Supreme Court of the United
"Id. at 955.
13366 U.S. 717 (1961).
o
"4United States v. Stein, 14 F. Supp. 761 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); United States v.
Foster, 81 F. Supp. 281 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
"United States v. Sorce, 3o8 F.2d 299 (4th Cir. 1962).
6At common law, a standard was not necessary to aid the trial judge in this
type of determination. This is evidenced by the fact that a juror who entered the
box with an opinion was ipso facto disqualified from serving. E.g., People v. Miller,
125 Cal. 44, 57 Pac. 770 (1899); People v. Wells, ioo Cal. 227, 34 Pac. 718 (1893);
and People v. Allen, 43 N.Y. 28 (1870). This rule has been somewhat modified by
statutes. E.g., Cal. Pen. Code § 1076; N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 376.
This position has also been modified by court decisions, and approaches the
standard announced by the United States Supreme Court in the Dowd case. In
United States v. Titus, 21o F.2d 210 (2d Cir. 1954), the juror said he had a casual
opinion of the case from newspaper reports, but that he could lay this aside and
and decide the case by the evidence presented in court. The trial judge then denied
the challenge. "The remarks of the juror justified the court's ruling." Id. at 214.
A different standard was announced in Geagan v. Gavin, 292 F.2d 244 (Ist
Cir. g6i), when the court said: "The best the courts can do, however, is to take a
prospective juror's word for his impartiality or for his capacity to overcome a tentative opinion on the merits, valued in the case of the trial judge, by an estimate of
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States in Irvin v. Dowd,17 involving a pattern of deep and bitter prejudice throughout the community. In reversing a death sentence, the
Court said that a prospective juror did not have to be completely ignorant, for to require that would be to establish an impossible
standard. A more realistic standard was adopted when the Court
said: "It is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court." I s

The Dowd standard is adequate when the jurors' claim of impartiality is factually sound.' 9 It is inadequate, though, when it can be
established that the jurors were not impartial, notwithstanding their
20
contrary assertions on voir dire
the prospective juror's character and intelligence formed by observation of the
general appearance of the individual concerned and his demeanor under examination." Id. at 249.
"566 U.S. 717 (1961).
'Id. at 723.
"5In Geagan v. Gavin, 292 F.2d 244 (st Cir. 1961), the court relied on the fact
that 3o6 of the 1104 (almost 28%) prospective jurors called had no opinion
at all as to the guilt or innocence of the accused. This was compared with Irvin v.
Dowd, supra note 17, where 8 of the 12 jurors had an opinion, whereby in the
Geagan case only 2 of the actual jurors had an opinion. Also, in the Geagan case,
there had been no passion aroused by the Brinks robbery. The court, in affirming
the fair trial said, "These voir dire examinations speak eloquently for themselves.
The most that they show is that the jurors had formed some impression or opinion
as to the merits of the case as might well be expected of intelligent and alert citizens
of the community." Id. at 249. The same situation appeared in Beck v. Washington,
369 U.S. 541 (1962); and Spies v. Illinois, 123 U.s. 131 (1887).
21in United States ex rel. Bloeth v. Denno, 313 F.2d 364 (2d Cir. 1963), a murder
conviction was reversed. Of the 16 juriors finally seated, after numerous ones were
excused because of pre-trial publicity, only one had not read of the case, 8 had no
opinion; and 8 thought he was guilty but said they could change it and render
an impartial verdict. On appeal, the voir dire was extensively examined because of
the claim of impartiality, but the court concluded that this impartiality was not
possible. The predeterminations placed an additional burden on the defendant that
he was not required to bear. "The record is convincing that such an impartial jury
could not be obtained in Suffolk County at the time this jury was drawn for the
trial of this case." Id. at 373.
This review procedure is illustrated in Sheppard v. Maxwell, supra note 1,
where habeas corpus was granted to the defendant on the basis of a biased jury
trial twelve )ears before. The trial court in Ohio v. Sheppard, 165 Ohio St. 293,
135 N.E.2d 340 (1956), found that the jury was impartial. On appeal, the court
said that "regardless of what might have been said on the voir dire examination,
the community was so prejudiced against petitioner that a fair trial could not be
had." 231 F. Supp. at 59. "This court now holds that the prejudicial effect of the
newspaper publicity was so manifest that no jury could have been seated at that
particular time in Cleveland which would have been fair and impartial regardless
of their assurances or the admonitions and instructions of the trial judge." 231 F.
Supp. at 6o.
For other cases where the appellate court has reached similar results see: Juelich
v. United States, supra note ii; and Irvin v. Dowd, supra note 13.
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2
Aside from the questions propounded to the jury on the voir dire '
by the court and counsel to discover prejudice resulting from pretrial publicity, the trial judge must also consider all the factors surrounding the trial in determining the existence of any prejudice. These
factors include the source of the publicity, whether it has emanated
from government or independent sources; the extent and inflammatory
nature of the publicity; the inconvenience to the government and administration of justice in granting either a continuance or change of
venue; the possibility of securing a substantially better panel at another
time or location; whether the alleged prejudicial material reached
the veniremen; and the time lapse between the publicity and the
trial.22 If the voir dire reveals purely objective reporting of the court
record, 23 or if the defendant has failed to show that the jury was actually biased, 24 remedial motions should be denied. When prejudice
does appear, however, change of venue and continuance are the two
major remedial motions available to aid the trial judge in securing a
25
fair trial with an impartial jury.
The motion for a change of venue is most useful when the publicity is intense 26 and well circulated in the area, 27 and when it is
convenient for the parties to have the trial in another location.23 When
2
'The appellate court must consider these questions and decide if they in any
way prejudice the defendant. If these questions turn out to be actually prejudical,
the conviction must be set aside on this bias as well. Marson v. United States, 203

F.2d 904 (6th Cir. 1953).

-'Northern Cal. Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. United States, 3o6 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.
1962); United States v. Bonanno, 177 F. Supp. io6 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). In Bonanno, these

remedies were outlined by the court in denying motions for continuance and change
of venue. The trial was ordered to begin and if any prejudice resulted, time would
still remain to guarantee the defendant a fair trial through a renewal of the proper
remedial motions.
3United States v. Synodinos, 218 F. Supp. 479 (D. Utah 1963).
2Buchalter v. New York, 319 U.S. 427 (1943)- "We have examined the record

and are unable, as the court below was, to conclude that a convincing showing
of actual bias on the part of the jury which tried the defendants is established."
Id. at 430.

2-When prejudicial pre-trial publicity is involved, various other remedial devices are available to defense counsel. They include: peremptory challenges, challenge
of the array, challenge for cause, motions to quash the indictment, motion for
dismissal, motion to declare a mistrial, and motion for a new trial. See generally
Annot., io L. Ed 2d 1243 (1964); Annot., 3 L. Ed. ad 2004 (1959); and Annot.,
31 A.L.R.2d 417 (1953).
OUnited States v. Parr, 17 F.R.D. 512 (S.D. Tex. 1955).
-Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963).

"'United States v. Florio, 13 F.R.D. 296 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). The publicity that appeared the day before the jury selection began, was intense, critically timed, and
prejudicial. In granting the motion for a change of venue, the court relied heavily
on the fact that there "was relatively minor inconvenience and little additional
expense in trying the case in another district." Id. at 299.
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nationwide publicity would prevent the drawing of an impartial jury
in another location, the change of venue motion should be overruled. 29
The motion for a continuance 30 will be granted when a change of
venue would be unsatisfactory.31 When granted, the continuance provides an opportunity for hostile sentiments to subside.32 When the
proceeding is resumed, it is hoped impartial jurors can then be empaneled. If, at the time of the voir dire, 3 there is any doubt about
obtaining a fair trial because of prejudicial pre-trial publicity, that
doubt will be resolved in favor of the defendant to protect his con34
stitutional rights guaranteeing a fair trial with an impartial jury.
35
In Delaney v. United States, there was national publicity due to
Federal Government hearings concerning the defendant's activities
as a Collector of Internal Revenue. The trial judge did everything
possible to minimize the effect of this publicity on the jurors, including cautionary instructions and questions to the prospective jurors
at selection. Only the first of three continuance motions was granted.
On appeal, the conviction was reversed on the basis that the other
'United States v. Bando, supra note lo. Since the publicity here was nationwide
and read by millions, equal prejudice would appear in any community served by
national press associations.
'United States v. Hoifa, 156 F. Supp. 495 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). Here the court discusses the practical approach of postponing the trial and says that "the court is
charged with the responsibility of making the best practical decision under the
circumstances; that is, to try the case and ascertain upon the voir dire whether,
in fact and in law, a fair and impartial trial can be selected." Id. at 5oo.
-"In United States v. Dioguardi, 147 F. Supp. 421 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), the continuance was granted to let the local community, from where jurors were to be drawn,
free itself of emotional tension. The voir dire would be held at that time to determine any need for a change of venue. Nationwide publicity may make a change
of venue useless and the continuance would be the only way of securing a fair
trial. This was the situation in Delaney v. United States, igg F.2d 107 (ist Cir.
1952).

!Often, however, this is not necessary and continuance motions are properly
denied. Such was the case in the United States v. Moran, 194 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1952).
Here the reason for denying the motion was that only 27 talesmen were questioned
in obtaining a jury satisfactory to both sides and only two of the 12 finally selected had read anything about the case in the newspaper. In United States v.
Suchman, 206 F. Supp. 688 (D. Md. 1962), the court said in denying the motion
that "the publicity here was not so prejudicial that the Court can conclude as a
matter of law that defendant cannot obtain a fair trial....2"06 F. Supp at 691.
Also, the motion should be denied when the publicity was not widespread. Green
v. Maine, 113 F. Supp. 253 (D. Me. 1953). The judge's discretion is a factor to
be considered and when he feels the circumstances do not demand a continuance,
such a motion should be denied. Centoni v. United States, 69 F.2d 624 ( 9 th Cir. 1934).
3As to a continuance motion, complete reliance on the voir dire examination
of prospective jurors can be seen in Rizzo v. United States, 304 F.2d 8io (8th Cir.
1962); and United States v. Malinsky, 2o F.R.D. 300 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
'United States v. Hoffa, supra note 3o at 499"5
19 9 F.2d 107 (1st Cir. 1952).
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continuance motions should have been granted to permit the effect
of the publicity to subside. By releasing and causing this publicity
while the defendant's indictment was pending, the United States
Government placed an unfair burden on the defendant. The court
said that the accused should not be forced to stand trial "while the
damaging effect of all the hostile publicity may reasonably be thought
not to have been erased from the public mind."303
The motion for a continuance places on the trial judge the burden of weighing the defendant's right to a speedy trial against his
right to a fair trial with an impartial jury. A fair trial with an impartial jury usually controls if it appears that a fair trial can be ob37
tained at a later date.
Often the motions for change of venue and continuance are made
together and in the alternative. In such a case, the voir dire examination of prospective jurors provides the trial judge with a basis for
choosing between these motions. On appeal, the exercise of the trial
court's discretion will be reviewed in light of the voir dire examina3
nation. S
When these remedial motions alleging prejudicial pre-trial publicity are not made, the defendant may be deemed to have waived any
right to claim error on this ground. 39 In United States v. Rosenberg,40
the court said raising the issue of prejudicial pre-trial publicity for
the first time on appeal was an "after thought," and just an attempt
41
to find a basis for reversal.
GId. at 114.
r'United States v. Dioguardi, 147 F. Supp. 421 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
'The conviction in Shepherd v. Florida, 341 U.S. 50 (1951), was reversed when

the Supreme Court of the United States found that the defendant had not received
a fair trial. The review of the entire case, including the record of the voir dire,
revealed "that these defendants were prejudiced as guilty and the trial was but a

legal gesture to register a verdict already dictated by the press and the public
opinion which it generated." Id. at 51. The prejudicial material consisted of a
press release by an officer of the court charged with the defendant's custody, stating
that the defendant had confessed. "[T]his trial took place under conditions and
was accompanied by events which would deny defendants a fair trial before any kind
of jury." Id. at 55.

Often the review by the appellate court results in affirming the conviction when
the record fails to disclose any prejudiced jurors. This is the case when the record
of the trial and the voir dire show that a fair trial had been received by the defendant, and not one tainted by prejudicial pre-trial publicity. Convictions were affirmed
in: United States v. Bletterman, 279 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 196o); Bianchi v. United
States, 219 F.2d 182 (8th Cir. 1955); and Callanan v. United States, 223 F.2d 171
(8th Cir. 1955).

nUnited States ex rel. Darcy v. Handy, 351 U.S. 454 (1956); Stroble v. California,
343 U.S. 181 (1952); Finnegan v. United States, 20o4 F. 3d 1o5 (8th Cir. 1953).
40200 F.2d 666 (2d Cir. 1952).

4'Defendant's acceptance of the entire panel without using all of his peremptory

